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PRESS BRIEFING
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENEttAL OF THE UNITED STAnS

ON

THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION STANDARDS
AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1976

'l2 :00 noon
Thursday,

June 24, 1976

Attorney General's Conference Room
:. S. Departm.ent of Justice
Washington, D. C.

--------

PRO C E E 0 I N G S
..........
THE MODEM,1'OR: Mr. Levi will brief on '1'i tle I of
And Secretary Matthews is holdinq a briefinq over

the bill.

at HEW at 2:15 this afta:noon on Title II.
I don t t MOW whether you

i

j,

.
I

have copies of the bill -

you do have copies.

I can ran throuqh what I reqard as the principal

iI

,
I

!

poin1:a about the bill, and perhaps that would be the most
helpful way 1:0 beqin thinqs.
t.rbere has always been an unanswered ques tiOI1, ~d

it may :ama:ha still unauswered if this bill is enacted in1:o

1_,

as to whether official acts of seqreqation by officials

whic:h should be taken account of in school cases should only

II
i

be. the act:s of those who have jurisdiction over the schools,

i

I

such as the educational board or some other &Clancy, or whetherl
I

other official act;s,· as, for example, wi th :respect: 1:0 housinq, if
seqreqa1:ion should be 1:aken in't.o account.
As I say, I think that really has never been
\I

decided.

If one looks at Section l of this bill, in c:onnect1on

I1

with llabillty, you will find \U1dar (b) (1) the followinq

!

provision t -'rhat no order under Section 5 of this Ti t1e shall
be baaed in whole or in part

011

an act or 'acts by a local,

State or federal aqency or officer other than the local or

I

~

State education aqency with jurisdiction over suCh scbool8,
Wlle.s the
;

~ourt

furtber finds, on the basis of evidence other

II'

I

than the effects of such acts alone, that the act or acts were
committed for the specific purpose of maintaininq,increasinq
or controllinq the deqree of concentration by race, color or
national oriqin in the student populations of the schools.

n

So that what we have done is to say that there has
to be a findinq of specific purpose to have an effect before
the operations of these other official aqencies can be taken
into account under this bill, in this relief, with respect
•

~

w

[

to the schools.

But it does not mean t.l:lat tl1cse other illegal acts should not be
dealt with. -In fact, it ~

ce the Opposite:' it would nean t.l:lat those·ill.eqaJ,

acts of segregation should be taken account of and should be remedied in p~
.

ceedinqs which deal with those matters, such as housinq and
So

on.
Thishas more or less been suqqested by the Sup:reme

Court itself, when it has said that there- is only -- if I can:
quote correctly -- so much baqqaqe that one can compel the
schools to car%j" in ma.kinq up for the illeq&1 acts of seqre
qation outside the area of the schools themselvas.
I
t

So that what we have done there

we

think is recognition of what the law is, although we have
I

said that we think that . if specific purpose can be shown
then it can be taken into account.
I think the most important provision in the bill is
Section 5, which is an attempt to state the theo:y of relief

in these cues.

And I will read from the middle of that, so

that perhaps by doinq that, it will emphasize the lanquaqe
that we thinlc is most important.
QUESTION: What paq8 is that on?
A'l"l'ORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I have a different
copy, probably, than you do, and so I' m a little bit -
not only that, but when I say Seet:.ion S, I guess yours will
say Section 105, probably.
So it's paqe 10 and it's 105(a).
f

__

Readinq f:.r:om the middle of thai:: "Accordinqly, such :
~

i

relief/which is the relief to remedy the effects reasonably
•

attributable to 111eqal acts of seqraqation.

"Accordinqly, such relief shall be no more extensive \
than that reasonably necessuy to adjUllt tl\e composit:.iol1 by
race, color or naticmal oriqin of the par1:ic:ular school so
affect:ed, or,if thai: is noi: feasible, the over-all pattern
in the school system so affected substan'tially to what 1t

would have been in nor.ma.l course, as determined pw:suant to
this section, had no such act or acts occ:urred."
Than, qoinq to (c) under the same section:
"In any haarinq conducted pursuant to subsection (b)
of this section, the local or State

educ:ati~n

aqeney shall

have the burden of 901nQ forward by the introduction of

l
I

1

aviden=. conc:erninq the deqree' to which the concentration by
race, color or national oriqin in the student population of

particular schools, or the over-all pattetn of student concen
tration by race, color, or national oriqin in the school
system is "8Sonably attributable to fac:tcrs other than the
act or act:s of unlawful discrimination found pursuant to
section

ft
--

It

I ques. it is l03(b) of this Title.
If such evidence is introduced, the findings required

by subsection (b) of this section shall be baaed on conclusions
and reasonable inferences from all of the evidence before the ,
court, and shall not be based on a presumption drawn from the
find1ngs of liability made pursuant to section"-- I quess it
is

l03(b~

of this Title, or otherwise1"that the concentration:

by race, color, or national oriqin in the student population

of

~

:

particular school, or the over-all pattern of concentra

tion in the school system as a whole is the result of acta of
unlawful disc::::ri.mination."
New, this is the, as I sl!t'J, I think the most
important part of the bill.

It contains, I have to say, our

nadinq of the Supreme Court cases.

It contains the

arquments that the Department would have made if it had decided
to file in the Boston case, that is, that we would have made

as to the appropriate leqal theory to be fol;towed.
Some people, no doubt, will sl!t'J that the Keyes case
suqqests that there is a presumption.

We do not think that the

Keyes case operates so that on a clear decision on the scope
I
. .
of relief, where the procedure is followed as in this case, th~

that presump1:ion would override a view of all of the evidence
whieb would be presented to the court, and where, as in this
I-)ill, we have put the burden of goinq fo:&:ward -on the school
board.
But, aside f%OJD, that, the arqument, I assume -- I
~

la:lOW -

that it will be teo difficult to detetmine

what the normal pattern, absent illegal acts and their effaC'l:s,
in the area would have been.
At times, in the discussion of this bill as it was
evolvinq, the point was made that it required a sc:hool-by
school analysis.

As you can

see, i 1: does not.

It doe., if

that. is not feasible, require an analysis of what the pattern
in the
New, this is a racognition that there are many
,-

faci:on which have nothinq to do with acts of seqnqation,
whic:h deter.m:.i.lle clusters of population, relationships within

!!
"t!

populat:.:Lon 1n tarms of economic status or whatever, in a
communi i:y •

And so that one would not: normally expect a racial

.
,I

:; balanc::e to be achieved in every school in many coll'Cluni ties.
,

-.
I:

I

I have to say that to Si!l¥ that is not

::

surprisinq~

!-

the Supreme Court has itself said that frequently.

I'

I~

We are saying

.. i

~hat

where there

::il have bee.n il18qal acts, and this bill is clear on the point,
-Ill

•

(l!~ that the illeqal aCt.t. have to be stopped, and their conse

t

quences have to be stopped.

We don' t think that that triggers

the mechanism which says that one qoes beyond the consequences
to requiriJlq a kind of integration in
the schools, which would not normally, absent illeqal acts,
and wi th a mixture of populations occurring naturally, we
don't think that one has to have a determined racial balanc::e
in every school.
Indeed, we think that it f S very likely that, for
the sake of all of t."e individuals in our society, that that
kind of a requirement may be not helpful •
. We know that it I

S

a

diffic::ult problem to determine what it otheNise would be,
that is, an approximation.
dif~ic::ult

We don' t think that that's any more

than tryinq to find out what the effects of the

illegal acts are, anyway, which is the present .reqUirement,
and we think that the school board should have the burden

;

:;

of goinq forward with the evidence, to show what it thinks
wou~d

have occurred in nomal c:ourse.

1
I

Of c:ourse, the whole bi 11 is an attempt· -- anel at

;
~'
~~

:

various places i t s tates this -- to try' to move things along
so that after the Court has issued its orden, the normal
\

course of events in the society under local- control, and with
good-faith obedience to the Court, will take over.
If you look at Section 106, that kind of mood
j','

~Lcited:

is
f

>

"All orden entered under Section 105 of this 'l'iUe shal1

rely to the greatest extent practicable and consistent with
effeci:ive relief on the voluntuy action of school officials,
teachers and students, and the court shall not remove from
the local or State educat:.i.on aqency its power and responsibil":
i ties to control the operations of the school, except to the
minimum extent necessa:y to prevent unlawful discrimination
by such agency, or i:o eUminate the present effeet::s of acts
of unlawful discrimination."
I don't suppose 4I1yone would really arqus with that.,
'I'he district

judq~,.

takinq over,· would say that they

certainly aqree 1i!ith this, that the problem has been that
there has been so frequently resistance from the school
boards, and frequently the:e has been resistance.
A

direction of this bill is to tr.f to set a s taDdardi

for relief, which we think: clarifies, which states the theory
which is in the Supreme Court cases', and

to do it in

a way which

can qive direction to the district caurts and te move alonq
the resteration of these communities, not only tD c;et rid of
the 111eqal effects, but then to have the nomal course of
events 'take over, always.providinq that that deesn't mean a
return to illeqal ac't:s.
Section 107, which is the section which deals wi til
court-imposed requirements fer transportation, is probably
the section which will be most talked about, I suppose.

I~'

should not read that,however, without noticinq the definition .'

which is given for the transportation of students under

(g)

in, I guess, Section 102.
That definition, which is not an unusual one, is that'
transportation of students means "the assignment of students
to public schools in such a manner as to require directly
or indirectly the transportation of students in order to
alter the di.stribution of students by race, color, or national

'

origin amonq the schools, but does not include the assignment :
of any student to the school nearest or next nearest his or
'

her residence, and servinq the grade he or she is attendinq,

,

even if the local or State. aqency providinq the transportatio~

,

.

;

to enable the students to reach that school."
So that when you talk about the effect of the
limitation that is imposed on the requirement for court

'

'

ordered transportation, you have to take into account that
it is not the definition which, to some extent, certainly,

.;

"
I;

,.

'

~akes

this less far-reachinq •.

:.

i:
j"

What this provision says is that in all cases where

,!

:

there is this requirement of transportation, after the order

;:

has been 9ivan and has been maintained in qood faith for three
years, the court can add an add! tional two year s .

,

I t can

,

;;
;;

1:
,
'.

.

":

continue it without that limitation if it· has not been

-ean continue it for

handled in good faith, but

tw:;)

years, and

;
1

\l

after there has in effect been five years of qood-faith

i! compliance, that is the end of the requirement for and the

permission for the court to order this transitional remedy,
&s

it is viewed in this bill, except in extraordinary

circumstances, resulting from failure or delay of other
remedial ettorts, or involving unusually severe residual
etfects of unlawful acts, in which case the court: may continue
the requirement in eftect as a t:ransitional means of last
resort: to such extent and for such lind t:ad periods

&s

the

c:ourt finds essential to allow other remedies to become
effective.
We

have tried very hard to balance the point that

we think, and we believe the courts think, that this kind of
trzmaportation is supposed to ·be t:ranaitional: 'therefore, it
should be limi ted in time but

there may be situations where,.

for one reason or another, the other measures ot reliet, even
thouqhthey have been observed in good fa! th, have not been
able to be effect:i va.
In that case, we think we have a rare case, an
extracrdina.:y case, and the court may -

but it is warned that

this is t:ransitional~ and that the period should be one which
fs limi~ed -- but it may continue it.
And there is also a provision which makes clear,
which I think would have been clear anyway t that if there is
a temination of the transportation and the court later finds :
that the local school agoeney has failed to ..comply in good
faith with the other court: orders with

resp~ct

to deSe9l:'e9ation,

or that other acts of unlawful discrimination have occurred,
so that no other remedy then is sufficient, then the court
may have tc reimpose this required transportation, and it will
have to do so

then, aqain in goinq throuqh the steps

oriqinally set forth.
There are two other provisions, or one other pro
vision that I think I should mention. . There is a prevision
which requires the court to notify the Attorney General of any
proceedinq to which the United States is not a party, in which
required transportation may be required, or that it believes it
may be necessary.

The Attorney General then -- that means,

of course,. the Department of Justice
full party or for a l.imi ted purpose.

may intervene as a
The limi ted purpose

,includes asking for the appointment of a
mediator to assist the court',. and the parties in the affected
communi ty J and, ~wo " for the formation of a committee of
communit¥ leaders to develop for the court's consideration
in framinq under any order a five-year deseqreqation plan,
includinq such elements as relocation
specific dates and

qoa~s,

0

f schoo ls, wi th

which would enable required trans

portation of students to be avoided or minimized durinq such
five-year period, and to be terminated at the end thereof.
I suppose the question miqht be asked -- I don't
know why I shouldn't let you ask it -- if we I re so certain
that this bill follows :.:...) cons ti tutional line, as we see it

in the supreme Court cases, then why is it necess art to have
this 1eqislation introduced which, in part, proceeds under
the -- and says it does, althouCJh it would be true even thouCJh
it said it or didn It -- under the authori t::t of Congress to
help implement the Fourteenth Amendment and i as power to
determine the relief qi ven by the lower courts.
I

think the answer is i:hat we do think this fo 1lows ;

the lina that we see in the supreme Court cases.
there are ambiquities in those cases.

We do think ;

We think that they

ha~

to be clarified, that they will, be clarified in due course.

Cases of this kind de not so frequently come to the court.
'!'hey de came to the court, usually after a lonq' history and
after problems with respect to the relief, and the district
court's orders, when the district court has many times had a
tOUCJh period workinq out the decree and attemptinq to get
compliance •
We think that it would be helpful if the Congress,
if it agrees, would state the kind of theory which we believe,1
as we say, is in the Supreme Court cases.

Bat the Conqress

can de it in a more encompassinq way ,and without waitinq for'
particular cases to come up.
and each with a history.

And, as I say, they come slowly,;

And that this will, itself, remove

a considerable uncertainty at the district court level as to
the direction to be followed, and that our belief is that if
this

ley~alation

is passea

that cases in the Supreme Court

would also clarify the law in the same direction.
So that we think that it's not inconsis tent with
<;oin<;

obviously not inconsistent with bein<; in cases at

the appellate level, but that it moves more quickly to shape
the direction of what the district courts feel they have to
do.
Now that I have raised the questions I thought you
mi<;ht ask, and no doubt answered them unsatisfactorily, I
will be g'lad to answer any ques 1:1 ons •
QUESTION:

Mr. Levi, do I interpret Section lOl(b)

to say that this law would not apply to cases such as

Wilminqtcn, where reUef has been awarded but not yet put
into effect?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

No.

It would not

have the effect that you suggest in the Wilmington case,
because no relief has been awarded.

Of course-, '-I-don't

know when this bill is going to be enacted.

But

assuming the bill is going to be enacted within a
reasonable period of time, I would have to say that
the -- no relief has been awarded in the Wilmington case.

QUESTION:

Mr. Levi, how does it affect communities

that are already under court order to consider these plans' now,

j

WI t

in general?
A'l"rORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Well, it says it shall not

govern proceedinqs seeking a reduction of such relief awarded.
prior to the date of its enactment, except for proceedinqs
brouqht under Section 107.
transportation.
of the Act, I

And 107 is that dealing with

So that the time runs from the effective date

bel~eve.

QUESTION:

And that's five years?

.

A'n'ORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, it would be three yearS,
then two years if the court: finds it necessuy.
Q UES'l'ION :

Mr., Levi, could you clarify that?

In

the Boston school case, for instance, if this leg-ialation
passes, it's another five years before the orders are
decided?
A'l"rORNEY GENERAL LEn:

Well, I can get into troub le'

IS to what matters of relief have been finally settled in the
Boston case.

So I don' t really want to -- and I assume there

could be an arvument about that, and I don' t want to get into
that..
QUESTION:

Well, in any ease now that's been

AT'roRNEY GENERAL LEVI:

But I would say that -- and

I ISsume this is true there, but I, just am. tryinq

to be

careful -- that where a case has been, where the relief has
been finally determined and put into effect, so far as the

transportation part of this is concerned, one would have
the three years and the two years.

Of course, it's always open

for a party to ask a court to modify a decree, and this would
not prevent that.
QUES '!'ION:

But the clock would s ti 11 be runninq

until -
ATTORNEY GENEML LEVI t

But the clock which this

requires wouldn't stop running' -
QUESTION: Wouldn' t s tart running'.
A'.r'rORNEY GENElW:. LEVI:

-- wouldn't s tart running'

until the effective date of this Act.. for them.

But they

could g'Q in earlier if they wished to.

QUESTION:

. But the case could come up for automatic

review, as it were, in three or four years?
A'r'l'O.RNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Yes.

Yes.

QUESTION:

Mr. Attorney General, there -

QUESTION:

Just like in the Charlotte-Mecklenburq

cue which was decided in 1971.
A'r'rORNEY GENERAL LEVI: That I s rlg'ht, they would

still under

th~s,

but that doesn't mean they couldn't come

in earlier if they wanted te.
QUESTION:

Well, it would have v.ery l i ttle effect

on this -
A1"l'ORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

on many of those cases.

Unless

It would have less effect
the teachin<]s of the

bill an catching, so that when they 9'0 in earlier they say,
Well, this bill may not be applied, but it obviously states
the theory that Conqress believes is the cons titutional theory,

and makes the arqument based on that.
QUESTION:

Mr. Levi, that theory, of cow::se, has

not been finally ruled upon

by the supreme Court.

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Oh, we understand that.

We t re not tryin<] to write a supreme Court opinion.

What we

have done is to look at the cases and to say this is cansistenit
with them.
I have no doubt that other people will say that it

isn't. and we raccqnize that by sayinq that there are know there are ambiqui ties in these cases.

we

That t S almost

inevitable in cases of that kind.
QUESTIOtl:

So it is possible that this theory, this

bill CQu1d be eventually ruled unccns1:itu1:ional?
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI,

I think it hic.;hly unlikely.

I really think it hiqhly unlikely, because the bill is so

moderate in its tone and so careful, I think, in the way it
proceeds, and so, as it has been said to me, so constitutionally
.~ responsib le

that I do not helieve that it would be held

unconstitutional.
.
,

That arqument.may"be made about it •

But I would not, myself, put muc~ weiqht on it.

i

: I think if you want to make an ..gument in that direction,
.

the argument would be somewhat different.

And if you want me ,

to make that, I would be glad to make it for you, .but I -
QUESTION:

Go right ahead.

ATTORNEY GEUERAL LEVI:

Well, I think the argument

wi 11 be that the bill is so vert reasonable
and takes into account so many factors that maybe it won't
make much difference.
Now, I den' t believe that.

I think it wi 11 make a

considerable difference, but I can see someone making that

QUESTION:

Have any of the civil rights people you

talked to given you an indication that they are going to
test it out?
A'l"rORNEY GENERAL LEVI:
at. all.,

I have no knowledge of that:

,

The-
QUESTION:

You don't expect this thing will go

through unchallenged, do you?

Even if it is passed 1nto law,

you expect someone to test it, don' t you?
A'1"roRNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Well, I -- I don ·,t know

whether their litigation strate9Y would .then be to test it -
if by that you mean to say that it is unconstitutional.
might

They

for all I know, they might decide they liked it.
QUESTION: Assuming they did, -

AT'ro,RNEY GENERAL LEVI: In'the first place, there are:
i,
quite a few t;....LlqS they might very w,ell like in it, so I don't;
I

-- I can't speak for them.

They have sometimes spoken for

me~

but I don't think that's good•
Have they told you so far that they like

QUESTION:
it?

A'rroRNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I don't think they have

really seen it, they have heard discussions about it, and I
think that they would

prefe~

no legislation, many of them,

but I don t t know that -- I don t t know that anybody can speak
for all civil rights people; but I wouldn't think that I
could,

althouc;h I think. I can speak for some of them.
QUESTION:

Would you

-- (inaudible)

throu<;h Congress '1
A':WRNEY GENERAL LEVI:

I can't -

I do not know

the answer to that.

QJESTION: Mr. Isvi t in
advance of the recent
wiretap legislation. you sent to the Hill, you did a q.rea.t deal
of work prepar.ing' the go.JXlds for this sdx:ol question. Have
you dale anythinq like that with this bill so ~ h.a.ft
any assurance of how' you are goinq to be treated on this bill?

A':WRNEY GENEl1AL LEVI I Well, the Department of

t)JUStice

itself has not done that kind of work with the Hill

on this bill, but I'm. not sura that I can .speak for other
branches of the government.
QUESTION I

Mr. Levi I in view of the background of

this leqislation, in view of the fact 1;hat businq is a central'

issue in the campaiqn, is there any reason why this cannot be'
partially viewed as simply a politically motivatinq maneuver
ordered by the Whi 1:e House?
A'r'l'ORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Well, it I S a stranqe.

question, because ic almost reads like some of
the provisions of the bill that miqht be criticized.
don I t know whether there I s any reason why anything

I

can't be viewed as political durinq a political yearl and
I suppoae that anythinq 1:0 which that question

is asked, you'd have to say, the very fact thai: the question
is asked means thai: some people reqard it as political.
I don I t reqard this as political.

Tha t's no1: how it arose.

The Department beqan workinq on

leqislation around -- sometime after November, and we always
had in mind the ques tion of hew one could best advance the
Departm.eni: IS position, which i.5 stated here, whether it was
to be at the Supreme Court level or in leqislation.
I

don It personally -

if that I s what you are askinq

me -- I profess to be, and have been described as, amateurish
in these matters.
political matters.

So I den l t profess to he competent in
I wouldn't think this was -- I

denlt see

.

myself, the political qain from this leqislation.
l,

But It m not the one to make that kind of a determination •

~

;

;

i

I

think our ati:itude here, so far as I knOW' -- and

!
'

i

i

I must s a:y I I ve had very close association with him -- as far

as I know, the President's attitude has been that this has
been an area where responsible goveJ:MnCe
and that the very fact that durinq

has been required,
so lonq a period

and durinq, say, this las t year, the Department has had to won

so hard.

and I hope effectively, to hold down violence in

particular places with its Community Relations Service, to
try to help with the communit:ies and so on.

It means that this is an ,rea where one should
endeavor to try to brinq some clarification and soma stability'.
Assuminq, as we do, that -- and as the President is very clear
on -

that this is not 90inq to be qoinq b aclewards in

~erms

of prahibi t:inq the i11eqal acts and their effect's.
So you -

and I sq in that connection you have to

leek at the other part: of the bill whic:h Secretary Matthews
is qoinq. to talk about, because I think the tW'o are very
closely related, and there was a joint operation

be~ee~

tne .

two Depa.rt:ments •

In fact, I told him this morninq,that's why I was

; sort of am;azed at Mr. Havel's introduct:ion of me, that I would
l
<

discuss his part of the bill and he
QUESTION:

sho~ld

discuss. moine.

Mr. Levi, I think you are a little

;uncomfortable
that the President is now out on the campaign
:
:: trail stubbinq his toe and sayinq that he is the first one to
':
.;

:1 introduce effectiva leqis lation aqainst businq.
III'
I!
AT'l'ORNEY GEl'lERAL LEVI: tlell, I don t t know.

I!

I:

I f he is

~~e

first one to introduce effective legislation -- I like

these key words, you knew -- why, I hope he can take credit
for it.

But I'm not going to be -- you knew, I know that

we are U ving in a democratic society.
QUESTION:

Mr. Attorney General, the President

used the words "domestic tranquility" in his messaqe.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEV!:

Yes.

I

haven't -- by the

way, I haven't read the messa<Je, 80 --.
QUESTION:

Well, that t 8 familiar lanquaqe.

He

ei ted that, and yet the bill itself seems to a,ffect a very

narl,"CW set of circumstances, as, in effect, the warning
all school bouds not engaqed in illeqal acts.

=

And in the

great majority of cases for businq that's going on now, they
won't be affected by this bill.
A'l"rORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, but I think that -

it

is true that we are not qoinq to tJ:y to relive the history
of the last twenty-som.e years, but there are an enoxmous
number of school districts -- and the estimate that we have
and that otllers have is about 600 of them. -- which can be
candidates at the present moment for what. you refer to as
businq.
And I don't know how
,

;

(

words seem to get -

=

refer to it:, because all the

have special connotation.

So it's not a problem- that is behind us, it'8 -- fo~
j

i

those' eom.munities, it.' s very much befCJru them.

.1

QUESTION:
raised

.t)

Do you think there migh t be false hopes

in Boston and places like that, that there would be -
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I shouldn't think so.

I do think that the bill might be some incentive for good-

faith compliance.

Because they never get to the end of the

five-year period until there has been good-faith compliance.
And I hope that there will be some incentive at beinq
inventive and going ahead with other remedies, so that the
kind of perpetual transportation is not required.

QUESTION I

Mr. Levi, do you mean to say that these

600 school districi:s are likely to have unlawful acts that

have been made by the school boards, is that what you t re
saying?
A'rl'ORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

Well, that they have had

them, and th.at there are il18qal effects, and that. they could
be candidates for this kind of -

QUESTION:

Could you discuss wbi te flight, which -

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

QOESTIONI
.

Yes.

Dis CUB s whi te fli gh t?

By definition, it is the result of

the school boards frequently a selfish result of the leqal
,,;jestraint of acta.

Would your bill provide for a court

:

~ remedy to the effect of white flight under ~ circumstances?
'

.i

t

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

I don't -- I take it that

.

the sUqge8tiOD is that the -- that, is there something in this

bilol which is contrarj '.:0 the Milllxen case, so that a court

findinq that there is white flight can retaliate by covering
the suburbs.
Th. answer is no.

QUESTION: Well, Mr. Levi, are most of these 600
communities in the north?

Thai: you meni:ioned -

A'l"l"ORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I haven t t -- I

t..~ink

they are allover, but I -- but certainly probably more
of them are in the north, bui: I think they are allover.
QUESTION: And another question, sir:

The President.

said in his speech that sane judqes in the lower federal
courts have gone too far by extending busing 1:00 broadly or
resorting too quic:kly to busing as a .remedy.

Which federal

courts have done that?
A'J.'IrORNEY GENERAL LEVI z
to answer that question.

Yes, well, I am not going

I think it is -- and you will have

to bear with me on thai: -- I think it is inappropriate for

an 'Attorney General to -- from the Department of Jusi:ice and
not. in the court -- to go arotlnd labeling particular districts:
and cow:ta as havinc; qon. too far or noi: far enougb.,
And I have, avoided doing that.
doinq it for two reasons:
of propriety about
,

the court -

~

I have avoided

One, because I have some feeling

doing that, whereas, it, seems to me, if

if the oepartment is qoinq to wish to take those

i

i

i

posii:iona, ii: could. well take those positions before the

l

c:oux'\...

i

.

., ..... ':"'

•

But, secondly, I don't want eo be responsible for
stirring up particular communities, especially where, in ordel:

.l to

make a considered judqment of that kind, really you

shouldn I e just be looking at the opinion of the court or the
relief that it gave, but you should know a great deal about
the record in the case.
So I prefel:' not. t.o do that.

If ete assumption is

that one cannot point to -- that in the absence of my giving
that answer, one cannot point to such federal court decis ions,
then my response is, really, that I don I t think that anyone who

has read them would really take that position.
But I don 't -

QUES'1'ION:

I really feel inhibited about that..

How do you feel about the President?

A'.r'rORNEY GENERAL LEVI,

Well, the President is the

President.

QUES'l'ION:
with the

~nq

Mr.

~vi,

are you particularly happy

of the adoption of this leqislation?

A'1''rORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I think if that t s a
restatement of the political point, I am not -- I find that
this is

~

area which in some ways doesn't make me happy at

~)all, exc::apt that we are txyinq

t:.o do our duty, so to speak,

in the sense that I think that it's a responsibility that the
Cepart:ment has to try to clarify this area.
I don I t -- I know this is qoinq t:.o be an extremely

:

l

.

controversial measure, probably, because ie's so reasonable.

And, therefore, itls goinq to irritate people on both sides.
I have no doubt about that.
it is

cer~nly

And it's not the -

not my recipe for how to win friends, or

somathinq of that sort.
I think it's responsible action.
I

I think it's -

think that it's part of the duties of the job.
QUESTION:

As

to the time involved, would you

rather have waited a little bit lonqer?
A'l'TOlmEY GENERAL LEVI:

No, I don I t think it -

I miqht have wished that we had had leqislation somewhat

earlier. And of course

rftJ

fondest wish is that the leqislatioD

bad been prepared and enacted before I came down here as
"

Attorney General.

QOES'l'ION:

Mr. Levi, one of the key provisions of

this is a requirement in the local situation of t:yinq to
detexmine what is caused by illeqal discrimination and what
is not.

What kind of qround rules are qoinq to be set?

00 they have to qo back to the first

A'l"rolWEY GENERAL LEVI:

QUESTION:

slave -- or

01'1, no.

Come on, now.

No, I'm not -- I'm.serious.

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:

The answer is:

don' t have to 90 back to the first slave.

No, they

And it isn't that,

it' s lookinq at a community and seeinq what it includes,
what kinds of groups it includes, 'what kind ..of, as I said
before, economic status there is, what mobi.:u.ty there is in

the c:ommunity.

I assure you that just

as

educators and

socioloqists have been able to say somethinq about the
illegal effects, there won't be any difficulty in qettinq
them to say what they think would be a normal pattern to be
expected, absent those illeqal effeeta.
And that would mean that, taking into account
chanqes in our 80ci81:'1, the kind of upward mobill t:y th.at
occurs, the kind of movement of populations that you could
expect, the location of communities, the location of schools
which would normally have drawn from different qroups and
didn't.

So that you would be able to, I think, to come up

with a rational kind of picture.
Which has same real virtue to it, because if you
were going to take the other -- if you don't have that kind
of picture in mind, then it seems to me it's very .hard to

_.knew

wh.a~ the illegal effects in fact are.

It's "rt hard

to know what to say about the racial balance that ouqht to
be achieved in particular schools.
Just let:.me say on thiS, as a fomer educator, and
therefore one who can throw the bunk around, that I -tt.rink
this 1s an area of substantial ignorance on the -- and I am
not new talkinq about what the soe1oloqical studies would
show about the conditions, but I think as to what is good
schooling', and what kind of relationships and arranqaments
:nake for better schoolinq, particularly- for students who may

have been disadvantaged and who, under proper conditions,
can catch up, which is the important thing to keep thinking
about.
I think these are areas where there is still
considerable mystery, and that being the case it's not qood
for a court to mandate requirements which go beyond the
illequ effecu. and make determinations about what the
compositions of particular schools have to be, which may
turn out to be not only beyond the illeqal effects, but not
desirable, at least in sene people's view, from an educational
point of view.
I don't think the ":"- I have read various studies
of how s·tudents do under different arranqements.
has problems
My

as

One always

to the tests and the ways that one judqes it.

own judgment on it is that those studies, not any of them

are definitive.
out about.

And it's a very difficult thinq to find

In fact,. it's so difficult that some people now are

writing articles on why it's so difficult.
QUESTION:

Mr. Levi, do I understand the lanquaqe

in this section on page II -

that it extends to -

(inaudible)

lettinq the municipal jurisdiction off the hook here by
sayinq, Well, look, it was nothinq

the school boarc1 did -

the school bearc1 saying it's nothinq we did that caused any
deseqre9ation in the schools, when, in

truth,

in fact there

has be'=iu a hazard and a change in -- [inaudible} -

So go aftertbe hazard.
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI:
QUESTION:

Well, my answer is that -

You mean it lets them off the hook?

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI: Well, I don' t think it gets
them off the hook, it depends on what you think the preseat
law is.

I suppose'some people who might say that we put them :

on the hook by putting in specific purposes we have.

That's

a question of how you read the cases.
We have dealt wi th that situation, but not in such
a way as to, I don' t think, to dramatically change the
present. law.

It may be a spur to -- if one is needed, it may be
a spur to effect!ve relief, more effectiva relief, dealing
with those officials, those official agencies that have
caused the seqreqation.
. Now, of c::curse, one can make the arqument that
evexythinq is interrelated, but the Supreme Court itself has
been vexy careful about that.
'

'

QUESTION:

Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.

